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SHE SENTIMENTS expressed by the former
U.S. trade representative above could have easily
been made by trade representatives from any
industrialized country about their own country.
In the last few years, many industrial countries
have become increasingly concerned over the
lack of international protection of intellectual
property rights (IPR).
In a 1988 study, the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC) attempted to estimate the
economic effects of intellectual property rights
infringement by foreign countries on U.S. firms.1
In its survey, firms estimated their losses at
$6.2 billion in exports sales in 1986. These losses
accounted for approximately 1.4 percent of the
total export sales of products which are covered
by some form of intellectual property rights that
year. Firms estimated additional losses of $1.8
billion in sales in 1986 due to imports that in-
—Clayton Yuetter,
U.S. trade representative, 1986
fringed on their domestic IPR. In a related study,
Feinberg and Rousslang (1990) estimate that the
ratio of lost profits to worldwide sales of firms
selected from the USITC study ranged from
0.05 percent for the extractive sector to 3.6 per-
cent for the entertainment sector.2 Since firms
incur research and development (R&D) expenses
to develop intellectual property, these lost sales
and profits defer firms from undertaking the
risky process of developing intellectual property
in the future.
Frustrations over the lack of effective interna-
tional agreements regarding IPR have led the
United States to unilaterally create measures to
deal with what it perceives as unfair trading
practices. In particular, the so-called “Special
301” clause of the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 requires the U.S. Trade
Representative to identify countries that do not
1USITC (1988). For limitations of the survey and data, see
the study.
25ee also Feinberg (1988).
The pirating of U.S-financed research and development discourages
innovation, denies markets to American exports, and threatens technological
progress. Protection of intellectual property rights preserves America’s
technological edge, which is a key to our continued international
competitiveness.”adequately protect or enforce IPR. The trade
representative then has the authority to bring
an unfair trade practice case against that country.
Although several countries have been put on a
“priority watch list,” no cases have yet been in-
itiated by the U.S. Trade Representative under
the “Special 301” designation.
Countries throughout the world, particularly
the more industrialized ones, are interested in
increasing the amount of protection and enforce-
ment of TPR internationally. Their concerns are
seen in the current negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT
is the principal rule-making body for interna-
tional trade, whose goal is to eliminate trade
barriers that reduce the free flow of goods. In
the current round of negotiations, the so-called
Uruguay Round scheduled to end in December
1990, one of the 15 negotiating groups is devoted
to developing an agreement regarding “trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights,
including trade in counterfeit goods,”~Current-
ly, intellectual property rights are explicitly ex-
cluded from GATT’s auspices.
There are many economic and legal issues
related to the protection of intellectual proper-
ty.4 The analysis in this paper focuses only on
the trade-related aspects of IPR, that is, the ef-
fect of differential (and uncertain) IPR across
countries on trade and the benefits and costs of
creating international standards for protecting
intellectual property.
Intellectual property is an invention, idea, pro-
duct or process that has been registered with
the government and that awards the inventor
(or applicant) exclusive rights to use the inven-
tion for a given period of time. It confers
“...the right to exclude others from making, us-
ing, or selling the invention within the national
territory.”5 (For a discussion of why intellectual
property is awarded protection, see shaded in-
sert on pages 39 and 40.) Industrial property
protection is generally awarded only to new
and useful products and production processes.
Intellectual property is protected by the govern-
ment in a variety of ways. Copyrights are
awarded to protect original works of author-
ship, such as literary, artistic and musical
works; trademarks allow a manufacturer ex-
clusive rights to a distinguished name, symbol
or mark.6 As noted above, these rights are only
valid in the countries in which a patent applica-
tion has been awarded. This lack of an interna-
tional IPR system could have a significant im-
pact on the amount of innovative activity.~
~~I.t1L~:.I.NTI ~
The protection awarded different types of in-
tellectual property varies substantially across
countries. As shown in table 1, most countries
have patent lengths of 15 years or more.8 His-
torically, an innovation was awarded patent pro-
tection for the number of years approximately
equal to the amount of time it took to train two
apprentices (14 years).~Although the apprentice
system has been obsolete for many years, patent
lengths have remained essentially unchanged.
Often, however, the actual period in which a
firm can sell its product under patent protection
is shortened considerably; for example, tests for
~GATT(1990), p. 11.
4For a discussion of some of the legal issues regarding IPR
in international trade, see Meessen (1987). To narrow the
focus of the paper, two issues have been ignored: which
items should be protected by intellectual property regula-
tions and what type of protection—patents or copyrights—.-
is appropriate for certain types of goods, such as software.
~USITC(1988).
°Othertypes of intellectual property, such as trade secrets
and mask works, constitute a small percentage of all in-
tellectual property and are not discussed here. In addition,
because there are no internationally agreed-upon defini-
tions for intellectual or industrial property, these definitions
should be considered chiefly as guidelines.
‘Intellectual property protection is important insofar as in-
novation is desirable. Some analysts argue (see, for exam-
ple, Nordhaus, 1969; Grossman and Helpman, 1989) that
innovation increases growth worldwide, improving the
quality of life through such things as better medicines, im-
proved living conditions and safer production processes.
Of course all innovations may not be beneficial, nor do all
people necessarily benefit from all innovations (see, for ex-
ample, Kamien and Schwartz, 1982 and Maskus, August
1990). In this paper, it is assumed that innovation has a
net positive effect on a country’s growth and on growth
worldwide.
DAlI countries referred to are members of the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO). All statistics in this sec-
tion, unless otherwise cited, are from WIPO (1988).
9Benko (1987).proc.Iurt safe~ Rvhirh. for pltrinarecitii’als can
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of countries Industrial Percent
Product that exclude countries’ industrialized
Pharmaceutical products (PHARM) 47 8 17.0°/a
Animal var,eties (ANIM) 59 18 30.5
Methods for treatment of humans
or animals (TREAT) 59 18 30.5
Plant varieties (PLANT) 57 18 31 6
Biological processes producing
plant or animal varieties (BlO) 56 18 32 1
Food products (FOOD) 34 8 23 5
Computer programs (COMP) 48 20 41.7
Chemical proaucts (CHEM) 21 2 95
Nuclear inventrons (NUC) 13 2 154
Pharmaceutical processes 10 22 0 0
Food processes 9 33 3 3
Microorganrsms 8 1 12.5
Substances from microbiological
processes 6 1 167
Cosmetics 2 0 0 0
Fertilizers 2 0 0 0
Mixture of metals and alloys 20 0.0
Agricultural machines 1 0 00
Antrcontamnants 1 0 00
Methods of agriculture or
horticulture 1 0 00
1 Tnose are the Weste’n European countries. Japan. Canada. Australia United States New Zealand
and Iceland.
SOURCE \Vo’id Intellectual Property Organization fl986~Table 3
Selected Patent Exclusions by Country
Industrialized
Countries PHAAM ANIM TREAT PLANT BlO FOOD COMP CHEM NUC
Australia xx x
Austria-Belgium xxx x x
Canada xxx x x x
Denmark x x x xxx
Finlano-Norway x X 7 x xxx
France xxx x x
Germany xxx x x
Greece xx x’ x1
Icelanri x
Ireland





Portugal xx x x x x x
Spain xx x x x x x
Sweden xxx x x
Switzerland’ xxx x x~
United Kingdom xx x x
United States x
Total 5 18 18 18 18 8 20 2 2
Developing
Countries
Asian 13 6665 7 2 63
India x xx x x x
Indonesia
Pakistan x
Rep. of Korea xx x x
Thailand xx x x x x
Afncan 82 0 18 20 20 5 18 1 0
Western Hemisphere 10 8 7 88 8 2 63
Brazil x x x x xxxx x
Mexico x x x x xxxx x
Venezuela xx x
European 8 7 8 5 566 6 5
Eastern 7 454 26365
Total 39 41 41 39 38 26 28 19 11
TOTAL 47 59 59 57 56 34 48 21 13
NOTE: See table 2 for definitions.
‘If filed through the European Patent Convention (EP~.
‘Includes Liechtenstein
:IL.echtenstein excludes if filed through the EPC.
SOURCE. World Intellectual Property Organization (1988)curs in some excluded industries—for example,
genetic engineering—it generally takes place in
countries that do not exclude them from protec-
tion. For example, although European firms ac-
count for 82 percent of world investment in in-
dustrial plant and other biotech assets, only
2 percent of it was spent in Europe. Similarly,
77 percent of all patents in biotechnology were
issued in the United States and Japan, which of-
fer the most extensive patent protection.”
The length of copyright protection, on the
other hand, is a more standardized measure
across countries, with the majority of countries
issuing copyright protection for the remainder
of the author’s life plus 50 years.
Other factors that influence the extent of pro-
tection for intellectual property are the enforce-
ment of existing laws and the amount of copy-
right and patent protection in other countries.
These factors are particularly important when
examining the trade-related aspects of IPR.
TD.;tL.).J~ 1IHL.z:~UH.flAS.PECT.S (I~F9
Sti%’1jT~r~flm1m3cnr ~ :.iS~.S11Es
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The problem with the lack of an international
system of rules regarding IPH occurs when the
cost of copying an innovation (including the cost
of penalties if caught) is less than that of either
purchasing or leasing the technology itself.
There are primarily two ways that a product
patent can be infringed upon: First, a copy of
the product can be produced, with essentially
the same characteristics (although not necessari-
ly the same quahty) as the original, but with no
pretense of being the original product. Typical-
ly, such copies are sold at a lower price. An ex-
ample of this occurred in 1976 when Kodak in-
troduced a line of instant cameras that were
similar to those already patented by Polaroid. In
1986, U.S. courts ruled that Kodak had infringed
on Polaroid’s patents and awarded the Polaroid
Company $5~7billion; this amount was reduced
to $909.5 million in 1990 on appeal.
The second type of patent infringement would
occur if a company produced a camera similar
to Polaroid’s and labeled and sold it as a Polaroid.
This is an example of a ‘counterfeit” product. In
this instance, Polaroid’s trademark as well as its
patents would be infringed upon.
International trade can affect even non-traded
products that are protected by IPW For example,
suppose a pharmaceutical firm, call it SAW, re-
cently developed a new product called NOCOLD,
that cured the common cold and had no side ef-
fects. If the firm intended only to sell NOCOLD
in its own country (call it the North), it would
file for a patent only in the North.
Even if SAW does not export NOCOLD, how-
ever, the rate of return earned could be affected
by international trade. For example, a firm in
another country could create either a counter-
feit version or a cheaper imitation of the pro-
duct and export it to the North.” Similarly, a
country that is producing NOCOLD legally could
export it back to the North.13 If sales of the
foreign-produced product in the North reduce
SAW’s sales of NOCOLD and its profits on the
product, the firm would expect a lower return
on NOCOLD as well as all prospective products.
Because the expected rate of return affects the
decision to develop new products, the firm
undertakes fewer projects in the future. Thus,
protecting intellectual property is not just a
domestic issue.
If the company that infringed upon a patent
in either of the two ways was not a US. com-
pany, the patent laws in both the United States
and the country in which it was located would
have to be considered. Unless an agreement
states otherwise, a patent or copyright is valid
only in the country in which it was issued14
Thus, if Kodak had produced and sold its cam-
eras in countries that did not honor Polaroid’s
patent, Polaroid would have been unable to
sue Kodak. Because many patent violations oc-
cur across national borders, differences in pa-
11”Bugs that Divide” (1990).
l2Not all countries have made it illegal to import products
that infringe on domestic patents.
“Parallel trade, which occurs when a product produced
under a patent in one country is exported to another coun-
try and competes with the patented product in that coun-
try, is legal in many countries and for intra-EC trade
“There are surprisingly few agreements among countries to
honor each other’s patents. This is discussed in greater
detail later.The Economics of Innovation
Thei-e are essentially Ut C) types cii Iechiio- While the OpliortUilitv t’ost of apital is eLIsV
logic-al innot ations: piiifl~.sjnhiOt’~itiOns,vi hich to detenrunc fit is simply the interest rate)
ai-e nevi production procc~sesoi’ improve- the i-ate of c’turn on H&.D is niore diiticult
ilWnts Oil existing Lechnohigv. and pr’oduc.’f in- to asc:eilEiiil. It cit’jit’ricb Ofl hOW iflLicll l1&-I)
nova[ions, which ate the creation of nntt pro- ilitist be spent hefore a runt product is dis-
ducts cli unprovi’ments Oil existing prOducts.’ cmcwetl arid det eloped, how niuc:Fi cleiiiaiici
But Ii t_vf)ei, of iniiovn [ion are patt3lltal)lC. lie— there will be lot the new prcicluc I, anti iiow
(taUSC [lie economics of these lvi o aid’ (‘55tH]— much pr’oduc Iion costs will he. 11w i eturti on
tiai]v the saint’ tlu’ (lisciis’~ionfoc.use on pro— R&.l) also depends on the time tlit- firm can
duct on innot ation br sirnphit:it’. . produce the product exclusively and Uiere-
lore earii (‘Cd)iid)iilid’ fWOfits. ~\hi]e the lust
hitellectual propeL-tv has the untisual (al— -. - -
-- three factors are outside the scope of this
thong Ii not Uniq uc’~proper! v that Uic kiiow- paper, the last lactor denionstrates liott IPH
Ic’cIgri it coota iris is not cleph”tcd with cise - For --
- can elIed the inc enLive It) ifl Illit’d te
exanip It’. ii0 matter how man\’ times the foi’-
niula for aspirin is used. the lormtila itself --
In the ahsetice of govl ‘i-runon t mten enttoil
(that is, di c- knowledge c-uifltiiiied in the pa- ... .-
- mm ti Lainin~C~\ ti USi\’C I‘i~h [S to aii Innotation tCIII) ren iair) s unchaiiged. As a result, the .. - - -
- -- - tar ant’ period of tune is often dillic tilt. (,it’en
iiiai’ginal cost oF using this knowied’’e (e.g., - .-
-. - - that the mai-gmat cost of usirig tlie Itnowledge
the formula ioi- aspirin) is zero. I or economic . . .-
- c-i-cited by the itinotaDo i is z. n’o, one cmihi
elf ceilit, this k novi ted“c shotdd be matie — roiiclud e that governments have no rcason to
available to anyone interested. because doing -. . -
-.- - - award these -ights. i if out asstgnirig cix-
so doe3 not diiiiii iish ilte stock ol kflow iridge -. - -
-- chtisit’e rights to produce the innovation, lion- (DI’ i’edLJd’t’ die ritiinljcii ol (jules aspIrin can -. - .-
-- ever tIn’ ~tinount of tInic~the innotatni’t I urn
he in,tde). Over tune, hosvc’vc’i’, stic’li a policy . C’ -
- can prociLice the pt oduct is both less rertmn
wooId I iat e some tint or Luna I.e (-Oil,er~ uenti’s. -
and likely slioi’ter: tint’ other firm that c-an
Generally ninot ation is the i’esul I of invest- figure out how to make the prcxlti’rt (Otild
mei it expenciit ti i-es on research and develop- also produce it without changing t bc knots -
went (R&D). Because expenditui Cs on R&,[) ledge associated with the innovation. i-ut e.\—
ocr-ur before a i ievi prodi ic I is crea tnil the ampIe a firm iiiii I did iiol di scot or tlie for-
firm’s decision to incur tlit’sc~costs nt alt-es incila for aspic ii hut instead, was able to
considerable uncertainty. ‘lhe expe ted tate produce it tt’ottld mechice the return ea:’necl
of return on R&.l), vi hich is the present dis- h~the innovating firm. -l Ins is true even
counteti value of the stream of net opem-ating though enfl’v b~’the noinnriovating fir’ni in
pruiit~-dit’idecl h_v lie present value ol the this market does riot diminish the innovating
R& 1) costs, has to he at least is gnat as the (irm’s ahihtt to produce a5-pit’iri. 1 his t etititec]
oppui I unity cost of rc!soum-ces dc’t ott-cf to return on the investment in R& I) appear~ a
Hi’z I) — that is. the expc’ctc’cl i—ate of i etw-n increase ci EU ic~nc-vby pi-onloting c-ompeLitiori:
that vi mild hate been ear-neil il [lit’ stinict lion et er. it also ic-duct’s thic’ number ot B& I)
resource—i allocated to H&.l) tvc’rc’ lit t~sted projects that nill be undc’t-Laken. If. however,
c-ken lure. the govei-nnient assigns propertt i’ights to
The economic reasons for copyngnt protection, essen-
t’aUy the same as those for patent proiect:on are no’
discussed separately. The reasons for protect-ng
trademarks however. oiffer from those for patent and
copyrights, as tracomarks are thought to provJoe nfor-
—iation for consumers about the qual’ty of a proouct.
Protect-on of t~adema--cs,sintended to ensure tnat
‘hey have some -r.4ormazive value to consumers. rather
than to protect an dea ‘[sec40
innot ations (amid enforces thc’nu), ttleti the tv rights are a n a~- tiE ren’ard ing fimmii s for in-
amount of time the product can he produced curring the risk ,issociatecl with R& I) by in-
cxc’ Iusivelv n i Ii iiic-reasc’, I’d si rig the i-a I.e of cm-eising the ox pr’cted ia tc’ of return on R&D.
i-i-furn on R&D. whir-li in turn has a posi Live theretiv making niorc’ projec’ts possible.
dice t on the amnoun to finnovation - - -. - As tomig as innovatJon Is c-onsidem-ed
tiE course. the tt orlci is riot c ertain. there desirabtc- assigning propem-tv rights to in-
is no nay of know irig in advance whet hem tel Icct~ia I pi’opL~rt is one way to encou iage
he R&D expenditures with pi-ociucc’ an eco- firms to ittnovaU,
noimucahlt’ viahile pt’ociuct. intellectual pm-opec-
2There is some disagreement as to how much PR in- iFor a general discussion of the role of R&D on innova-
creases nnovation (see. fo~ example. Maskus. 1990) lion, see Kamien and Schwartz (1982). In addition the
The question is a difficult one to measure empirically issue of deterrnin~ngthe optimal length and breadth of
because it requires determining what a firm would do a patent ~w;thin a country1. has recently been d.s-
in a situalion that has not occurred. One attempt to do cussed in the RANDJournal of Economics (Spring
so is Mansfield (1986~.who finds some role for patents 199O~and Economic Inquiry ~October 19881
in encouraging innovation.
tent laws across countries and the lack of an in-
ternational enforcement system affects the in-
centives associated with innovation.
irn anti iniernatkma.I Trade: .zin
Suppose that SAW wanted to sell NOCOLD in-
ternationally as well. A firm can do this one of
three ways, all of which are affected by the state
of international property rights. For simplicity,
the example below compares the case in which
only one of the two countries protects IPR.
Direct Exports First SAW can export
NOCOLD directly to another country, which we
will call the South- If the product is not pro-
tected by a patent in the South, either because
SAW has not filed for protection there or
because the South does not protect IPH, cheaper
copies that use the same formula as NOCOLD
could be legally sold. Similarly, if the trademark
is not protected, counterfeit products that are
indistinguishable from NOCOLD can also be
legally sold. These copies decrease SAW’s total
sales and profits associated with producing and
selling NOCOLD. In addition, if the product has
a trademark that is strongly associated with
SAW, the counterfeit product, if of significantly
poorer quality, could adversely affect the
reputation of the firm and further harm the
sales of both NOCOLD and future products of
SAW.
Lit’ensing SAW can also license the technolo-
gy to produce NOCOLD to a firm in the South.
The Southern firm, in turn, pays SAW a royalty
fee. Without protection of TNT, however, a fiim
has no incentive to pay licensing fees if it is
cheaper to copy the product than pay those
fees. For industries where licensing represents a
significant proportion of its revenues, the lack
of IPR can cause a substantial loss of revenue
for a firm. For example, motion picture firms
receive considerable revenues from licensing
fees paid by foreign distributors. Every
pirated” copy of a movie that is sold or shown
represents a loss of revenue for the movie com-
pany15
.Fin’ehp-t iitirect it~tnso The third possi-
bility, called foreign direct investment, occurs if
SAW locates production facilities in the South to
produce NOCOLD. Again, ho~vever,the lack of
IPR in the South has a similar effect on innova-
tion as discussed previously. Because SAW has
no guarantee that it can control the production
of NOCOLD in that country, the expected rate
of return on the innovation is smaller, reducing
the profitability of foreign investment in the
South; as a result, fewer firms will engage in
such foreign direct investment. A country’s lack
of adequate protection of tNT could be particu-
larly costly in this case because the country is
foregoing some of the benefits of foreign direct
investment, such as new resources, training and
isFor a discussion of the effects of international piracy in
motion pictures in the United States, see USfTC (1988)
and Piock (1989).employment. Obviously, counterfeiting firms
might provide some of these same benefits; since
they develop no new products themselves,
however, they are dependent on others for in-
novations to copy.’6
As long as the direct cost of counterfeiting (or
copying), including the likelihood and penalties
associated with being caught, is less than the
profits earned by the firms doing the copying,
firms will continue to pirate technology. Copy-
ing, however, lowers the rate of return earned
by innovators and therefore the overall amount
of innovation. In the long run, the resulting
decline in the amount of innovation reduces the
counterfeiting that can be done by firms in the
South. On an aggregate level, the citizens of
both countries end up worse off. There is less
innovation, fewer products overall, and world-
wide growth is therefore lower.
While the vast majority of countries have laws
protecting intellectual property, the arguments
presented above describe what occurs in coun-
tries that either have weak IPH or simply fail to
enforce whatever JPR they do have. Given the
apparent advantages of protecting intellectual
property, why are there so many problems with
trade in goods affected by intellectual property
rights? Part of the answer to this question can
be found by examining the current international
system of regulating intellectual property rights.
CLJi.4.itEJ\i’TSViiTFJFcOOI )? iT\1JJi:l4]~tJi%,.
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The main organization responsible for interna-
tional agreements on tPR is the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO), which is ad-
ministered under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. WIPO’s objectives include administering
international treaties and agreements on intellec-
tual property rights and encouraging the protec-
tion of tNT worldwide.17 Currently, 125 coun-
tries are members of WIPO,18 Table 4 provides
a partial list of these countries and of signatories
of several treaties administered by WIPO. The
two major international agreements on IPR are
the Paris and Berne Unions, which deal with in-
dustrial property (including patents) and copy-
rights, respectively. (For a description of the
two agreements, see shaded insert on page 43.)
In addition to these unions, other international
property right agreements administered by WIPO
cover such things as industrial design, satellite
transmissions and registration of trade and ser-
vice marks’°Not all members of WIPO, how-
ever, are signatories tothese unions and treaties,
nor are the number of signatories for each
agreement identical (see table 4)20
ru4:xts~..:_,.~6 .Ppfttnf iitnj~t:ittiinns
One important issue regarding the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property is the problem
of differential patent regulations across coun-
tries. For example, while most countries deter-
mine patent eligibility based on a first-to-file
basis, the United States employs a first-to-invent
rule. As a result, patent protection for the same
invention could be awarded patent protection to
different applicants depending on whether the
actual inventor was the first to file.
WIPO has had some success in trying to stan-
dardize the process of obtaining patents interna-
tionally through the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT). This treaty allows applicants to file for a
patent in a central office and specify in which
of the signatory countries (shown in table 4) it
wishes the application to have effect. This pro-
cess reduces the costs of filing for patents by
centralizing the search and examination work
associated with determining patent eligibility.
The PCT is also designed to increase the time
an applicant has to decide whether to withdraw
the application for foreign patents. A firm might
choose to withdraw its patent application and
avoid the expense associated with translating
the patent application into the local language
and finding a local patent agent if the demand
for the product to be patented is likely to be
too small.
‘tWhether or not foreign direct investment is desirable for
developing countries is a separate issue and is discussed
elsewhere. (See, for example, Hood and Young, 1979.) For
the purposes of this paper, we assume that the lack of
IPR does not mean a country doesn’t want foreign direct
investment—there are more straight-forward ways to
reduce or eliminate foreign investment.
1TFor a list of organizations that are solely administered by
WIPO, see WIPO (1988), p. 8.
‘8These statistics exclude the German Democratic Republic
because of the unification with the Federal Democratic
Republic that occurred on October 3, 1990.
‘°SeeWIPO (1990a).
2clhe United States, for example, did not sign the Berne
Union until 1988.Table 4
Signatures of Selected International lnteflectuai Property
Agreeme~~~
Industrjalizea Members of Treaties







Germany x xx x
Greece xx x
Iceland x Ic x
Ireland x Ic x
Italy x x
Japan x x x
Luxembourg xxx x
Netherlands mc mc x mc
New Zealand mc mc x
Portugal mc mc mc
Spain mc x mc mc
Sweden mc mc mc mc
Switzerland2 mc mc mc x
United Kingdom mc x mc
United States mc x mc mc







Rep. of Korea mc x
Thailand mc mc
African 40 25 14
Western Hemisphere 23 t4 2
Brazil mc mc
Mexico x mc mc
Venezuela mc mc
European 11 12
Eastern 7 7 73
Total 101 59 21
TOTAL 125 83 43
‘Dominican Republic, Iran, Nigeria, San Marino and Syria are not members of WIPO
‘Includes Liechtenstein.
iHong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are nom members of WIPO.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that relate to the interpretation or application of
the Paris and Berne Unions. There appears to be
no penalty for ignoring the ruling of the Court.
WIPO does require countries to give applicants
access to the same legal remedies for patent in-
fringement as they do their own nationals. This
requirement, however, is subject to existing
laws for patent violations. In fact, many coun-
tries do not have explicit penalties associated
with violations of IPR, and few impose civil
penalties. According to WIPO, as of 1988, only
14 countries had laws requiring the seizure of
infringing patent articles, 20 countries granted
compensation of damages and 11 destroyed in-
fringing goods. There is somewhat more protec-
tion for products with trademarks. WIPO is
now preparing a study that will examine the
possibility of establishing a new treaty which
creates a dispute mechanism to arbitrate possi-
ble violations of international IPR agreements.
Lt~$r.lssues
The problems described above explain why
there is considerable concern about the current
international system of IPH. Having an interna-
tional set of rules regarding the protection of
intellectual property reduces the uncertainty
associated with innovation and increases the ex-
pected return earned on those innovations. ‘this
does not mean that all countries must have the
same degree of protection—GATT, for example,
has different rules regarding the acceptable
amount of tariffs for industrial and developing
countries. Rather, an explicit set of agreements,
along with an effective mechanism to mediate
disputes, could significantly decrease the loss of
earnings associated with copying and counter-
feiting innovated products. In addition, such
agreements could reduce the information costs
of determining the amount of protection of in-
tellectual property. These costs can be substan-
tial for firms that intend to sell their products
internationally, and, as described above, must
file for a patent in each country where it wants
to sell the product. Similarly, given the current
system in which countries can choose to ex-
dude specific products from patent protection,
firms are faced with the choice of selling their
products in some markets with no protection or
avoiding certain markets altogether. Developing
countries that protect IPR will increase its access
to new technology because innovating firms will
have stronger incentives to produce and sell




Why are there so few (and such weak) interna-
tional agreements on IPR? One primary difficul-
ty in protecting and enforcing IPR is that the in-
centives to do so differ across countries, par-
ticularly between countries that are technology
exporters and those that are technology im-
porters.24 Generally, less innovation occurs in
developing countries; instead, in the absence of
licensing or foreign direct investment, firms in
these countries tend to produce goods whose
production technology has become standardized
or whose patent protection has expired.
Firms that successfully pirate technology in
many developing countries are often able to
produce essentially the same product at sub-
stantially lower production costs. Because there
is less innovation in developing countries, the
cost of not protecting tNT (reduced future inno-
vation) is often less, at least in a static sense,
than the gain associated with selling these
products.
An argument often made by developing coun-
tries is that there is ‘excessive” protection of
IPR in industrial countries. The optimal amount
of protection of intellectual property is difficult
to determine within a given country. This issue
becomes more complicated in an international
context, because what is optimal from a domes-
tic perspective may not be optimal from an in-
ternational standpoint. For example, even from
a long-run perspective, the optimal amount of
IPH protection can differ across innovating and
non-innovating countries.2)
2tThis terminology comes from Maskus (1990). This analysis
can also be used within a country, where some regions
have industries with a lot of innovation (such as the Silicon
Valley in California), and others have very few innovating
industries. For an example of a model that looks at innova-
tion and technology transfer both within and across coun-
tries, see Butler (1990).
25Chin and Grossman (1988), for example, find that the
desired amount of protection between innovating and non-
innovating countries depends on the specification of social
weltare used and that strong IPR may not improve global
efficiency. Diwan and Rodrik (1989), in a ditferent
theoretical framework, also find that the optimal amount of
protection between the innovating and non-innovating
countries coincide only if welfare in the two regions is
weighted equally.Many poorer developing countries find it dif-
ficult to pay the higher price innovated goods
would cost if they are given patent protection
in their country. Developing countries therefore
have little incentive, at least in the short run, to
protect commodities they need (or want) but
could not afford to buy if protection is award-
ed. An example of this is seen in the pharma-
ceutical sector, which is awarded patent protec-
tion in essentially all industrial countries, but
not in many poorer developing countries, which
might otherwise have difficulty purchasing
medical supplies.
Another argument for not protecting IPR in
technology-importing countries is that reverse
engineering, the process by which firms take
products apart to learn how to produce them,
enables firms to learn how to develop new pro-
ducts themselves and therefore aids in a coun-
try’s development. As the technological know-
how improves in a country, these firms begin to
innovate themselves. When this stage is reach-
ed, protection of IPR generally begins to in-
crease.26
Given the current level of protection of IPR,
creating increased standards of protection, at
least in the short run and for the least-developed
countries probably in the long run, will
redistribute income from technology-importing,
developing countries (whose residents will now
have to pay more for these types of products)
to countries which innovate or already protect
IPR. As a result, success in negotiating increased
international protection for IPR will likely re-
quire some concessions to the developing coun-
tries in other areas of trade.27 These issues are
currently being discussed by WIPO and GATT.
The incentive to protect intellectual property
rights, as well as the actual amount of protec-
tion awarded, differs widely across industrial
and developing countries. Nevertheless, recent
negotiations under WIPO and GATT (which, as
of this writing, is yet to be concluded) regarding
the trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights indicate increased support for interna-
tional agreements on intellectual property rights
and a realization that such agreements benefit
both industrial and developing countries. In ad-
dition, as the amount of inventive activity and
the number of countries engaged in innovation
increases, the trend toward more cooperation
and protection of intellectual property is likely
to continue.
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